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forgiveness: a work of love?
john lippitt1
What difference would it make to our understanding of the process of interpersonal 
forgiveness to approach it as what Kierkegaard calls a “work of love”? In this article, 
I argue that such an approach—which I label “love’s forgiveness”—challenges 
key assumptions in two prominent philosophical accounts of forgiveness. First, 
it challenges “desert-based” views, according to which forgiveness is conditional 
upon such features as the wrongdoer’s repentance and making amends. But second, 
it also avoids legitimate worries raised against some forms of unconditional 
forgiveness. I argue that what we may call “love’s vision” has a crucial role to 
play in interpersonal forgiveness. Against the objection that viewing forgiveness 
as a work of love is problematic because love involves a certain wilful blindness, 
I argue (drawing on both Kierkegaard and Troy Jollimore) that a) love has its 
own epistemic standards, and b) pace Jollimore’s remarks on agape, his claims 
about romantic love and friendship can in the relevant respects be extended to 
the case of agapic neighbour-love. By developing this view—which I argue echoes 
important themes in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love—I show the importance of 
understanding “love’s forgiveness” in the light of other virtues, especially hope 
and humility. 
A prominent mode of discussing forgiveness—sometimes labelled “conditional” 
forgiveness—takes it to be something that has to be “deserved” or “earned”; 
something for which a wrongdoer must somehow qualify by meeting a set of 
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requirements, ranging from a sincere apology to some more extended list. 
(Supporters of this view differ on whether, once amends have been made, 
forgiveness is then owed, or whether offering it remains elective.) Charles 
Griswold’s account of “paradigmatic forgiveness” serves as a prominent example 
of this approach.2 Griswold offers various criteria required of wrongdoers to 
“qualify” for forgiveness: accepting responsibility for one’s action; repudiating 
that action; experiencing and expressing regret; acknowledging the harm done; 
and convincing the wronged party one is capable of and willing to pursue 
appropriate moral self-improvement.3 By contrast, adherents of “unconditional” 
forgiveness hold that no such requirements are necessary before forgiveness 
can properly be granted.4 However, more radical claims have sometimes been 
made about unconditional forgiveness. Jacques Derrida’s account, for instance 
(introduced in the context of a discussion of political atrocities), insists that the 
only true forgiveness is that which forgives “the unforgivable”. What leads Derrida 
to this controversial view is his assertion that forgiving a repentant wrongdoer 
involves forgiving someone “no longer exactly the same as the one found to be 
culpable”.5 What “true” forgiveness amounts to, he insists, is forgiving “both the 
fault and the guilty as such, where the one and the other remain as irreversible as 
the evil, as evil itself, and being capable of repeating itself, unforgivably, without 
transformation, without amelioration, without repentance or promise”.6 It is in 
this sense that any act of forgiveness “worthy of the name” would need to “forgive 
the unforgivable”. Anything less, Derrida alleges, would be a merely “economic” 
transaction, in which the wrongdoer pays back a debt through their repentance 
and amends-making. 
As a dismissal of conditional forgiveness as a genuine kind of forgiveness, this 
is too quick: Griswold is right to object to the claim that only “undeserved 
and unjustified” forgiveness is true forgiveness.7 I do not wish to endorse the 
Derridean view, nor the related claim that only such forgiveness has genuine 
moral worth. Note, however, that the implications of what Griswold says for less 
radical claims about unconditional forgiveness are extremely modest. “To forgive 
someone undeserving of the honor”, he writes, “under the banner of a ‘gift’, may 
condone the wrong-doer, and even provide encouragement to more offences.”8 
It also “risks undermining the agent’s sense of her entitlement to warranted 
resentment”.9 Perhaps so, but risks and possibilities are merely that. While we 
should take seriously Griswold’s suggestion (against Garrard and McNaughton) 
that a forgiveness that requires nothing of the wrongdoer may communicate to her 
and others that she is not being held accountable, and that thus the “intrinsically 
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interpersonal character of (paradigmatic) forgiveness is lost”,10 all this offers a 
space for “love’s forgiveness”. This falls on the unconditional side of the divide: it 
does not insist that certain conditions have to be met—by the offender (in most 
accounts) and also by the forgiver (in some accounts, including Griswold’s11)—
before forgiveness can appropriately be offered. But nor is it unconditional in the 
extreme sense to which Griswold objects. There is a morally admirable forgiveness 
which neither endorses the Derridean view, nor communicates to the wrongdoer 
that no judgement is being made on her actions. But insofar as the forgiver does 
not set prior conditions for forgiveness to be granted, such forgiveness remains 
unconditional. We can understand such forgiveness better, I shall argue, by 
considering it as a “work of love”. 
But first, let us back up. Since there is some disagreement about the question 
of what forgiveness is, I should sketch the basic picture I shall be working with 
here. (I have space here only to state this, rather than to argue for it in full.) 
Though typically expressed in a speech-act (“I forgive you”), such speech-acts 
are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for demarcating forgiveness (since 
forgiveness can be enacted without being explicitly declared, and conversely, such 
a speech-act can fail in its expressed intention: I can say I forgive you, while my 
actions and attitudes reveal that I have neither done so nor intend to do so). I take 
it that forgiveness qua psychological process is a more important territory, and it 
is this that has attracted most of the philosophical attention. I broadly agree with 
those who have followed Bishop Joseph Butler in judging forgiveness to involve 
the forswearing of a spirit of revenge, such that part of what forgiveness involves 
is conquering the excesses - though not necessarily the complete overriding—of 
reactive attitudes such as resentment, indignation, anger or hurt.12 The ‘such as’ 
here is important: I consider it to be excessively stipulative to insist that any one 
of these reactive attitudes must be the one conquered (this will vary from case to 
case). Forgiveness involves a ‘letting go’ on the part of the wronged party—but 
one that keeps the wrongdoer in view in such a way that one has towards them an 
attitude devoid of ill-will. Thus forgiveness is distinct both from forgetting, and 
from transcending reactive attitudes such as resentment or anger by replacing 
them with, for instance, contempt. But—as its etymology suggests—forgiveness 
is also a gift,13 typically from the wronged party to the wrongdoer.14 What the “gift” 
language connotes is that, even in cases where the wrongdoer repents and makes 
amends, forgiveness is still something beyond what the repentant wrongdoer 
“earns” by their repentance and amends-making. Finally, I hold that forgiveness 
is standardly of an agent rather than an act. Consequently, forgiveness is an arena 
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in which a version of the thought often attributed to St Augustine (to “hate the 
sin but love the sinner”)—or its secular analogues—does some important work. 
In such cases, one distinguishes the agent (who one forgives) from their deed 
(which remains morally condemnable).15 
What of love in all this? According to Kierkegaard, part of what it means to love is 
to presuppose love in the person loved - and in this way to “draw out the good”; 
to “love forth” [opelsker] love (WL 216-7/SKS 9 219).16 This view—one of the 
most radical aspects of Kierkegaard’s view of love—has important ramifications 
for how he construes forgiveness. If the process of forgiveness qua work of love 
is to meet this stipulation, then integral to any such view is hope, of an at least 
two-fold nature. First, the loving person hopes for the wrongdoer being willing 
to repent, to return to the moral community and to make amends for the wrong 
(compare Griswold above).17 Second—since we are here treating forgiveness as 
a process—I suggest that it also involves hoping for one’s own ability fully to 
forgive. This has important consequences for accounts of forgiveness which talk 
of the wrongdoer “qualifying” for forgiveness, because such a hope will typically 
need to be manifested before the wrongdoer has “made amends” (at least in full). 
We might say: love takes a risk, in hope. 
A possible objection to my general approach would be to say that it is simply a 
grammatical remark to claim that forgiving someone is a work, or expression, 
of love. But if one notes just how much discussion of forgiveness rests—either 
tacitly or explicitly—on a model whereby one qualifies for forgiveness by aiming 
to “wipe the slate clean” in some sense, then this objection fails. Note also that 
Garrard and McNaughton—two writers who given their overall position one 
might expect to be sympathetic to the claims of love in forgiveness—do suggest 
that forgiveness requires “an attitude of good will (or even love) towards the 
wrongdoer”.18 Yet—as the above quote suggests—even they seem cautious about 
going as far as to insist on the “love” claim. 
Can “love’s forgiveness” be hopeful without just being naïve? Put another way, 
does such a view involve a certain wilful blindness on the part of love? And if so, 
is this a fatal objection? “Wilful blindness” is a familiar worry in the philosophy 
of love—often raised in the context of discussions about love and the ethics of 
partiality—and it is one that readers of Kierkegaard have certainly not missed. It is 
a question that perhaps arises for any “vision” view of love. In what follows, I shall 
compare elements of Kierkegaard’s view of love with a valuable contemporary 
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such view, namely Troy Jollimore’s account of “love’s friendly eye”.19 While there 
is no explicit reference to Kierkegaard in Jollimore’s book, I find aspects of his 
account strikingly Kierkegaardian.20 The advantage of discussing Kierkegaard 
and Jollimore together, I suggest, is that each clarifies different aspects of “love’s 
vision”. Kierkegaard’s is without question a “vision” view of love: he is quite 
explicit that loving involves a kind of seeing, and as commentators have noted, 
images of “blindness”, “vision” and “seeing with closed eyes” abound in the text.21 
However, I shall argue that much of what Jollimore says in defence of romantic 
love and friendship also applies, from a Kierkegaardian point of view, to agapic 
neighbour-love. In particular, Kierkegaard resists the common assumption that 
whereas romantic love and friendship are particularised in their focus, neighbour-
love is just generalised benevolence. In stark contrast, Kierkegaard stresses the 
importance of attention to the particular in what it truly means to love one’s 
neighbour as oneself. In doing so, he anticipates Jollimore’s view that love has 
epistemic standards of its own. (As Jollimore talks of love’s “friendly eye”,22 so 
Kierkegaard speaks of love as a “lenient interpreter” (WL 294/SKS 9 291).) But 
in the context of forgiveness, Kierkegaard will add a focus on the importance of 
hope - including hope in the power of love to transform.
I. AGAPE AND ATTENTION TO THE PARTICULAR
Jollimore is clear that his primary focus is on romantic love and friendship 
(what Kierkegaard calls “preferential loves”), and is sceptical about agape. But 
much of what Jollimore says in defence of preferential loves also applies mutatis 
mutandis to agapic neighbour-love. Jollimore glosses agape as “God’s love for us”,23 
expressing scepticism both about whether humans are capable of feeling such 
love and whether it is a worthy ethical pursuit.24 I take it as trivially true that 
humans are incapable of feeling divine love in any full sense—but no defender of 
agape as a human ideal need deny that. Typically what such a defender valorises 
is neighbour-love in the sense of the second biblical love commandment: that 
we should strive to love all, including those to whom we do not feel the kinds of 
attraction that characterise such “natural” loves as romantic love and friendship. 
It is unclear whether Jollimore is rejecting this notion of agape as an ethical ideal. 
What matters for my purposes is that Kierkegaard’s view of neighbour-love is 
significantly at odds with the view of agape Jollimore expresses when he claims 
that it involves “no appreciation of or attention directed towards its object”.25 
Perhaps the clearest account of this is to be found in the deliberation “Our duty 
to love the people we see” (WL 154-74/SKS 9 155-74), in which Kierkegaard argues 
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that genuine neighbour-love does require the kind of attention to the particular 
that Jollimore claims not to be agape’s concern. Here, neighbour-love requires 
us, in Jamie Ferreira’s words, “to see the other just as he or she is, in all his or her 
distinctive concreteness”.26 Ferreira argues that this deliberation signals a crucial 
shift in the emphasis of Works of Love: a move from relative abstraction towards 
a focus on “vision” as a means of emphasising concreteness and particularity.27 An 1843 
discourse of Kierkegaard’s, “Love hides a multitude of sins”, anticipates this: “it 
does not depend, then, merely upon what one sees, but what one sees depends 
upon how one sees; all observation is not just a receiving, a discovering, but also 
a bringing forth, and insofar as it is that, how the observer himself is constituted is 
indeed decisive”.28
Whether the observer is one who loves, then, is crucial. This trails what will become 
an important theme in the second part of Works of Love: the differences in how 
attitudes of trust and mistrust, hope and despair, interpret ambiguous evidence 
about the people we encounter, as part of a gloss on what it might mean for love 
to “believe all things” and “hope all things”.29 But in each case, what is being 
commended is not some generalised attitude of benevolence, but believing and 
hoping in the context of a particular concrete other. 
Kierkegaard, then, would agree with Jollimore that love has epistemic standards 
of its own—but he would also argue that this applies to neighbour-love as well 
as to preferential loves. With this in mind, we can draw on both Jollimore and 
Kierkegaard to show how love’s “friendly eye” or “lenient interpretation” is a vital 
factor in sketching what a forgiveness that is a work of love might look like.
II. “LOVE’S FRIENDLY EYE”
On Jollimore’s account, the lover must see the beloved “in the best possible light”, 
typically minimising their weaknesses and flaws. This is, we might say—with a nod 
towards either Dusty Springfield or ABC (depending on our age)—the “look of 
love”. As Jollimore recognises, there is a range of possibilities here, not all of them 
defensible. For instance, he approvingly cites John Armstrong, for whom to love 
“is to interpret another person with charity. It is to believe the best about them 
which is consistent with the facts”.30 The qualification is important: its purpose 
is to exclude outright “denial” or falsification of the facts (such as claiming your 
partner could not possibly have drunk a whole bottle of wine before driving home 
and narrowly missing that child, despite the fact that everyone else at the party 
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witnessed her do so). What I want to endorse is not such cases of self-deception, 
but cases where we don’t “incorporate” the flaws “into the overall image”.31 Such 
a view generates the objection that Jollimore considers: isn’t such “blindness” 
about the beloved a distorting phenomenon?32 In the context of forgiveness, the 
worry would be that the “look of love” might be blind to the demands of justice, 
sliding into condonation or excuse (notions from which it is widely agreed that 
forgiveness needs to be distinguished).
Central to the argument of this paper is that Jollimore’s response to this is ultimately 
the right one: to acknowledge that epistemic partiality can be a problem, but to 
insist that we should be careful not to exaggerate its importance. This is because 
love’s own epistemic standards pose a threat to “the allegedly objective standards 
that are sometimes, wrongly, assumed to represent rationality itself”.33  I want to 
endorse Jollimore’s central claim that “love suggests a certain kind of epistemic 
practice, one centred on close attention, empathy, and generosity of vision, one 
that tends to conflict with other sorts of epistemic practice, particularly those that 
take neutrality and detachment as their presiding virtues”.34 But—crucially—I am 
also arguing that this applies to neighbour-love as well as to preferential loves, 
and that this has important implications for interpersonal forgiveness. Let me 
unpack this.
As a preliminary, let us re-emphasise that we are dealing with a range of possibilities. 
When the faults are trivial or irrelevant to the circumstances, viewing them as 
lovable quirks35 or outright “blindness” to them poses no significant epistemic 
problem. In other cases, what the “look of love” sponsors is that we do not focus 
on the faults, refusing to let them determine our overall view of the loved one. 
(This is what I take Kierkegaard to mean when he talks of the “closed eyes” of 
love’s forbearance and leniency (WL 162/SKS 9 162).) We shall see the relevance 
of this in more detail towards the end of this section.
Jollimore discusses an example from a paper of Simon Keller’s, which attempts 
to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility.36 It 
concerns the generosity you owe your friend Rebecca, who has ambitions as a poet 
and who asks for your support at a reading where she hopes to impress a literary 
agent. You have reason to believe that the poetry typically read at this venue is 
poor, and so ordinarily would have no reason to think Rebecca’s will be any better. 
But on account of your friendship—so the argument goes—you owe her not only 
to turn up, but also to listen to her poetry with an openness and generosity that 
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would not be justified by what you know about the venue’s standard fare. What 
is crucial in Jollimore’s critique of Keller is the claim that the generosity of spirit 
you owe your friend does not constitute an epistemic fault. We have no obligation 
to assume, as Keller assumes, that “an ideal evaluator of Rebecca’s work would 
aim at ‘critical and dispassionate judgements’ formulated from a detached point 
of view, or that ‘to allow the poetry to strike him in the best possible light’ and to 
‘actively seek out its strengths’ would be to commit epistemic errors”.37 Indeed, 
Jollimore adds that “it is quite doubtful that a person who did not allow a poem to 
strike her in the best possible light, or attempt to actively seek out its strengths, 
would be able to find anything of value in the poem”.38 
Note that the attitude Keller commends is strikingly similar to the attitude 
Kierkegaard describes as “mistrust” in “Love believes all things”. Mistrust is 
said to believe “nothing at all” (WL 226/SKS 9 228), in the sense of withholding 
judgement until there is “proof”, convincing itself that no conclusion is possible 
and thus withholding trust rather than taking what it sees as an unwarranted 
risk. But Kierkegaard argues that mistrust’s “shrewd secret” is in fact a “misuse 
of knowledge” (WL 227/SKS 9 229): it wrongly infers from ambiguous evidence 
that the need to withhold one’s trust follows as a necessary consequence. He 
suggests instead that this simply reveals something about the person making this 
judgement: “When knowledge in a person has placed the opposite possibilities 
in equilibrium and he is obliged or wills to judge, then who he is, whether he is 
mistrustful or loving, becomes apparent in what he believes about it” (WL 231/
SKS 9 233). 
Moreover, one feature of neighbour-love is to bring to each and every one of “the 
people we see” precisely the kind of openness and generosity of spirit we more 
naturally bring towards those we love “preferentially”. Jollimore suggests that in 
pursuits where evaluators need to pay close attention in order to grasp what is 
admirable or innovative about a performance, “epistemic partiality would seem 
to demand, with respect to our loved ones, precisely the type of focused, generous 
attention that an ideal evaluator would lavish on everyone”.39 
But—extrapolating from the specific example of performance—this ideal 
evaluator is precisely the goal for which neighbour-love strives. And though we 
will each likely fall short, we see something of such an attitude in Raimond Gaita’s 
famous example of the nun he encountered in the psychiatric ward on which he 
worked in his late teens. Patients whose abominable mental conditions had led 
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them apparently to lose all dignity were treated like animals by some hospital 
orderlies. Those whom Gaita calls “noble psychiatrists” nevertheless insisted 
upon the “inalienable dignity” of these patients. Yet the attitudes of both the 
orderlies and the psychiatrists to the patients were brought into sharp relief by 
the attitude of a middle-aged nun who profoundly impressed the young Gaita: 
everything in her demeanour towards them—the way she spoke to them, 
her facial expressions, the inflexions of her body—contrasted with and 
showed up the behaviour of those noble psychiatrists. She showed that 
they were, despite their best efforts, condescending, as I too had been. She 
thereby revealed that even such patients were, as the psychiatrists and I 
had sincerely and generously professed, the equals of those who wanted 
to help them; but she also revealed that in our hearts we did not believe 
this.40
I take it that the attitude described here is not one that treated each such patient 
identically. Insofar as she demonstrated true neighbour-love, the nun did not 
respond only to something generic in all humans (what Kierkegaard calls the 
“common watermark”). Rather, such love required seeing what this particular 
neighbour needed, in these particular circumstances. That is what the nun 
managed, which the psychiatrists, with their nobly intentioned but ultimately 
“condescending” talk of “inalienable dignity”, did not. 
Beyond this particular example, we can say more generally that the all-inclusiveness 
of neighbour-love seeks to extend the generosity of vision typical of friendship—as 
described in the case of Rebecca’s poetry—to non-friends.41 The overall point 
here is that the worry about being too generous to friends and lovers is only one 
side of the story. While this is indeed a potential danger, “failing to be generous 
enough” can also be an epistemic error.42 So there is no reason to suppose that 
the “look of love” necessarily leads us away from the truth: it might sometimes 
bring us closer to it, as when we consider extenuating circumstances to which 
friendly or parental love has the best access. The vision leading to the slack I cut 
my friend might be a more accurate judgement of the reasons behind the actions 
of the enemy I am tempted to condemn. We can conclude that it is not clear that 
“love’s vision” is “on the whole less likely to reveal the truth than is the detached, 
dispassionate view we tend to take of those we do not know or like”.43 In other 
words, in many circumstances “love’s vision” may be appropriate in the sense that 
while it is not epistemically mandated, neither is it epistemically forbidden.44 But 
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we can go further: sometimes it is only a loving kind of attention that provides a 
form of awareness that reveals deeper insights than any that are attainable from 
the perspective of detachment. (For example, a child who performs in a mediocre 
way on all the standard tests might have a specific latent talent—say for art—
that has been missed by all his teachers noted and nurtured by a loving aunt who 
really cares about her nephew.45 Not all paintings on the world’s fridge doors are 
atrocious, and some latent talents are only noticed by the “look of love”.)
But how does all this apply to forgiveness? Note that the literature on forgiveness 
typically places an obstacle in the path of love’s vision by the very talk of “the 
wrongdoer” or “the perpetrator”. This is a convenient shorthand, and it is hard 
to avoid. But its convenience comes at a price: those who have wronged us are 
presented to us under that description. Getting beyond thinking of them as only 
that—wrongdoers—is thus part of the battle. But suppose we apply specifically 
to forgiveness—contrary to the assumptions of the proponents of the view that 
forgiveness must be “earned”—the following thought. That “[w]hatever good 
may exist in a person … becomes apparent to us only if we adopt a charitable 
vantage point. To demand objective ‘loveworthiness’ in advance, prior to loving, is 
to assume a detached stance that prevents us from finding what we are ostensibly 
searching for.”46 In illustration of this, Kierkegaard has a memorable story of two 
artists, one of whom travels the world in search of a face worth painting, but 
comes back despairing of finding any without defects. The second stays at home, 
but reports not finding “one single face to be so insignificant that I still could not 
discern a more beautiful side and discover something transfigured in it” (WL 158/
SKS 9 159). The hard task that love’s forgiveness demands is to try to bring the 
attitude of the second artist to bear in our view of those who have wronged us (or 
others). 
Yet sometimes this highly demanding task is achieved. There is an exemplary kind 
of forgiveness that is able to see the value in even egregious wrongdoers, in a 
way that goes beyond just the recognition of the common humanity they share 
with the rest of us (which—to draw an analogy with our discussion of Gaita’s 
nun—would take us beyond the orderlies but no further than the psychiatrists). 
If we ask what the value of the wrongdoer consists in, certainly part of it is the 
“common watermark” of our humanity: that which he shares with all human 
beings. But Kierkegaard’s insistence on loving “the people we see” suggests a 
need to go beyond just this, since this value is manifested uniquely in each case. 
Such vision is demonstrated by another nun, Sister Helen Prejean, “spiritual 
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advisor” to Death Row inmates and author of Dead Man Walking. In line with 
Kierkegaard’s focus on loving “the people we see”—as specific individuals rather 
than fungible recipients of a generic benevolence—she describes how she came 
to view the convicted murderer Elmo Patrick Sonnier as an individual who, 
despite his egregious crimes, was worthy of her care and understanding. It is not 
that Sonnier’s good qualities immediately impressed her, so while her attitude 
to him goes beyond mere recognition respect (that which is owed to any person 
qua person), it is not evaluative respect in this sense. Rather, I submit that what 
Prejean manifested was love’s generosity of vision: an openness to seeing the good 
in Sonnier that preceded any recognition of specific positive qualities in him. As 
Rick Furtak glosses Kierkegaard’s version of this idea, the thought is that “the 
unique and irreplaceable worth of this person will not be revealed to us unless we 
love them first, before we have entirely discovered why they are worthy”.47
In Sonnier’s case, it seems that Prejean’s attitude indeed “loves forth love”: as 
her friendship with him develops, Sonnier seems to grow as a human being. In 
the final days and hours before his execution, he expresses real gratitude to her 
for being the first person to show him what love really means (“It’s a shame a 
man has to come to prison to find love”). His gratitude is also extended to the 
lawyer who tries, ultimately unsuccessfully, to get his sentence commuted to life 
imprisonment (“Mr. Millard, thank you for what you and the others done for me 
… no, no, no, Mr. Millard, you didn’t fail…”), and to the chef who prepares him his 
final meal. Having earlier been tempted to use his final words to show hatred and 
defiance, in the event he asks forgiveness from the father of one of his victims.48
And this returns us to the importance of hope. When describing the task of love 
as being to find the object of our attention lovable,49 Kierkegaard immediately adds 
that by this he is not recommending “a childish infatuation with the beloved’s 
accidental characteristics, still less a misplaced sentimental indulgence” (WL 
166/SKS 9 167). What he calls the “earnestness” of love is said to consist in this: 
that the relationship itself will “fight against the imperfection” and “overcome the 
defect” (WL 166/SKS 9 167). In other words, rather than condoning or excusing 
serious defects, he expresses a faith and hope in the power of love to transform them. 
A key illustration of this is his discussion of Christ’s reaction to Peter’s betrayal 
of him: 
Christ’s love for Peter was boundless in this way: in loving Peter he 
accomplished loving the person one sees. He did not say, ‘Peter must 
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first change and become another person before I can love him again’. No, 
he said exactly the opposite, ‘Peter is Peter, and I love him. My love, if 
anything, will help him to become another person’. Therefore he did not 
break off the friendship in order perhaps to renew it if Peter would have 
become another person; no, he preserved the friendship unchanged and 
in that way helped Peter to become another person. (WL 172/SKS 9 172) 
Though the discussion is not explicitly about forgiveness, what is hinted at here 
is how the healing power of loving forgiveness—the vision of love’s “friendly 
eye”, held out in hope—illustrates the phenomenon here described. This is 
not to condone or to excuse. It is not to be “blind” to the offender’s faults in 
any problematic way. (Kierkegaard is explicit about this: “Christ still knew 
his [Peter’s] defects” (WL 168/SKS 9 168).) Rather, it is not letting their faults 
become the whole picture. It is to avoid seeing Peter exclusively through the lens 
of “wrongdoer”, “betrayer” or “coward”. 
In summary, we have trivial deeds or flaws, which the “look of love” can legitimately 
ignore.50 More significant ones, which need nevertheless not be “incorporated 
into the overall image”. And—overlapping with this—truly egregious deeds or 
flaws, where not letting them be “incorporated into the overall image” might 
require the sort of exemplary attitude manifested by Christ to Peter or by Prejean 
to Sonnier.51 Let’s see how Kierkegaard develops this beyond this specific example 
of Christ’s attitude to Peter.
III. KIERKEGAARD ON LOVE AND FORGIVENESS
First, let us recap. I have sketched parallels between Jollimore’s account of “love’s 
friendly eye” (discussed in the context of preferential love) and Kierkegaard’s 
view of love as a “lenient interpreter” (applied to neighbour-love). In this 
section, I shall expand upon features of love that, for Kierkegaard, are important 
to understanding forgiveness as a work of love. First, how in forgiveness love 
“hides a multitude of sins” by acknowledging a wrong but refusing to focus all 
one’s attention upon it. And second, how “love’s abidingness is a form of love’s 
hopefulness”,52 discussed chiefly in terms of love’s continued openness, typically, 
to possible reconciliation with the estranged other. 
The three Works of Love deliberations, “Love hides a multitude of sins”, “Love 
abides” and “The victory of the conciliatory spirit in love” all address forgiveness 
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and reconciliation. The first explicitly discusses forgiveness as one of the major 
ways in which love “hides” sins or wrongdoing, while the third—building on the 
second—focuses on the practice of reconciliation and restoring broken bonds. 
Love’s vision is integral to all these discussions. 
It is with respect to the first two of these deliberations that Kierkegaard 
commentators have considered a worry akin to that we discussed in section II 
above: that Kierkegaard’s ethic might involve “an unhealthy kind of blindness or 
wishful thinking or an intellectual dishonesty”.53 The most interesting prima facie 
case for the “unhealthy blindness” charge concerns those instances in which love 
“cannot avoid seeing or hearing” (WL 289/SKS 9 286) wrongdoing. Kierkegaard 
claims that it hides such wrongdoing in three ways: by silence (such as avoiding 
careless gossip, rumour-spreading and slander); by looking for a “mitigating 
explanation” (WL 291-4/SKS 9 289-291); and—where this is not possible—by 
forgiveness (WL 294/SKS 9 291). In the second of these cases—the mitigating 
explanation—Kierkegaard’s concern seems to be to remind us, in our rush to 
form unfavourable judgement of others, of the extraordinary variety of possible 
interpretations of most forms of human action, and to commend choosing “the 
most lenient interpretation” (WL 292/SKS 9 289) consistent with the facts. (This 
might involve condoning or excusing, where one can legitimately do so.) This 
continues the line of argument of earlier deliberations: that trust and mistrust, 
hope and despair, have access to the same evidence, and when forced to choose on 
the basis of ambiguous evidence, our choices reveal something significant about 
us. But the very inclusion of a third category, the need for forgiveness, shows 
that there are limits to how plausible “mitigating explanations” (condonation or 
excuse?) can be. So does the “unhealthy blindness” worry emerge in the specific 
discussion of forgiveness?
Although at times Kierkegaard appears to conflate forgiving with forgetting and 
with blotting out sin (drawing on biblical imagery of God as hiding sin behind his 
back54 (WL 296/SKS 9 293)), this focus on “hiding” is not a claim about wrongdoing 
having been wiped out as if it had never existed, but rather, again, a refusal to focus 
on it or to allow it to determine one’s global view of the wrongdoer. However, it might 
be objected, to say this is still not to answer directly the following question: why 
look with love’s friendly eye in cases of wrongdoing? I think Kierkegaard’s answer, 
complementing that sketched above, is threefold. Firstly, a religious claim: such a 
way of seeing acknowledges that all humans—even the worst sinners—are equally 
loved by God.55 But second, a claim that requires no religious commitment to 
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accept: that such a way of seeing best facilitates personal relations between flawed 
human beings; the kind of creatures where “every one so often needs forgiveness 
himself”.56 Third—anticipating Jollimore’s response to Keller—it reminds us of 
something which while obvious when stated, is often overlooked in practice: that 
just as trust can be deceived, so can mistrust; just as love’s “wilful blindness” will 
strike some as unjustified, so too can the look of suspicion (or malice, or envy) be. 
A reminder, in other words, of the defeasibility of our judgements—uncharitable 
as well as charitable.57 These points are, I suggest, recommendations of a kind of 
humility, inextricably bound up with hope. And it is the presence of hope for the 
wrongdoer that distinguishes “hiding the sin” as a refusal to focus all one’s attention 
on wrongdoing from a mere “looking the other way”, as Griswold puts it.58
The next Works of Love deliberation extends these themes: the fidelity of love 
discussed in “Love abides” is explored in terms of love’s continued, hopeful 
openness to the possibility of reconciliation with the estranged other. Here, 
Kierkegaard also makes that move which is controversial even within the 
Christian tradition: a bold valorisation of pre-emptive forgiveness, offered in love, 
which he treats as the touchstone of exemplary forgiveness. Love, he claims, takes 
the initiative; loving forgiveness is offered before the wrongdoer repents or seeks 
forgiveness.59 
Kierkegaard is well aware of a sometimes noted danger in the context of 
interpersonal forgiveness, that of forgiveness being wielded over the wrongdoer 
as a weapon. To counter this, he stresses the importance of sensitivity to the 
wrongdoer’s self-respect. Nevertheless the latter must become aware of their 
wrongdoing (what Kierkegaard calls love’s “merciful blow” (WL 339/SKS 9 
334))—and this is why we need to keep it distinct from condoning or excusing. He 
describes the balance that needs to be struck in terms of a combination of “rigor” 
and gentleness, commenting: “[w]hat a difficult task … to be as rigorous as truth 
requires and yet as gentle as love desires” (WL 339/SKS 9 334). Love’s forgiveness 
must thus be practised artfully.
But self-respect more commonly enters this debate in a different place: the 
concern about pre-emptive forgiveness is often that this is premature, signalling 
weakness, servility and a lack of self-respect on the part of the forgiver.60 However, 
notable instances of immediately proclaimed forgiveness—consider, for example, 
that of Gordon Wilson for the IRA bombers who took the life of his daughter at 
Enniskillen in 1987 or that extended to the racist murderer Dylann Roof from 
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several victims of the 2015 Charleston, South Carolina church shooting—do not 
strike me as involving these qualities at all. While such forgiveness is unconditional 
in the sense that it is offered pre-emptively, it is not unconditional in the sense to 
which Griswold objects (as discussed earlier). This is because forgiveness offered 
in love can be a loving gift offered in hope. As noted earlier, this hope has at least two 
targets: for the reform of the offender, and for the forgiver’s own ability fully to 
forgive. (In this sense, “I forgive you” can be a statement of hope or intent rather 
than a description of a state already achieved.)
The question underpinning such worries is again whether forgiveness offered in 
love threatens justice. So it’s important to note that nobody in the Enniskillen or 
Charleston cases thought that offering forgiveness was in any way inconsistent 
with letting the legal system bring the perpetrators to justice.61 But all this requires 
us to consider, in a little more detail, the relation of love’s forgiveness to other 
virtues—especially hope and humility. 
IV. ALLIED VIRTUES: HOPE AND HUMILITY
Hope is a more important dimension of Kierkegaard’s thought than is typically 
recognised.62 Nor is this all about hope for one’s eternal destiny. On hope in 
forgiveness, Kierkegaard’s position seems broadly Lutheran. Commenting on 
Paul’s discussion of faith, hope and love in 1 Corinthians—in particular the “love 
hopes all things” verse that so interested Kierkegaard—Luther insists that the 
hope to which Paul refers is hope for the good of others: 
Love despairs of no man, however wicked he may be. It hopes for the best. 
… Love is a virtue particularly representing devotion to a neighbour; his 
welfare is its goal in thought and deed. Like its faith, the hope entertained 
by love is frequently misplaced, but it never gives up. Love rejects no man; 
it despairs of no cause. But the proud speedily despair of men generally, 
rejecting them of no account.63 
Such hope is no naïve, sunny optimism. The sheer difficulty of manifesting it in 
the contexts of some wrongs means that it will sometimes need to be “radical” 
in something like Jonathan Lear’s sense of that term: the hope may be such 
that its precise content cannot be specified in advance. As Lear describes such 
“radical hope”, the best we can say is that “something good will emerge even if 
it outstrips my present limited capacity for understanding what that good is”.64 
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Such hope is connected to the patient openness to the future that one Kierkegaard 
commentator has called the virtue of “active receptivity”.65 And one manifestation 
of such receptivity is that openness to seeing the good in someone we earlier 
attributed to Helen Prejean.
We are now better placed to see the significance for forgiveness of Kierkegaard’s 
focus on striking the right balance between the “rigor” of what “truth requires” and 
the “gentleness” of what “love desires”. While “love’s forgiveness” does not stand 
by with a checklist, ensuring that the wrongdoer has first accepted responsibility, 
repudiated his action, and done enough to make amends, etc., before forgiveness 
may be dispensed, neither does it hope for nothing from the wrongdoer, fearful 
(like Derrida) that to do so would be to reduce forgiveness to an “economic” 
transaction. Thus it avoids Griswold’s worry, as outlined near the start of our 
discussion. Love’s forgiveness hopes for the offender to mend his ways in the kind 
of ways Griswold specifies—but it does not require proof of this in advance before 
forgiveness can be offered (and is in this sense unconditional). Love’s forgiveness 
is a gift, but not in the sense that Griswold rejects (where talk of gift “is taken to 
mean ‘elective’ in a sense that is not responsible to any moral reasons”.66) Love’s 
forgiveness responds to the kinds of moral reason I have drawn on Kierkegaard 
to sketch above: reasons such as a recognition of all as unique creatures of 
God or bearers of a common humanity, expressed uniquely in each individual; 
a recognition of one’s own flaws and vices (he needs forgiveness from me, as I 
do from others); a hopeful concern for the wrongdoer’s moral improvement and 
return to the moral community; and—sometimes—a restored relationship. 
The balance that Kierkegaard stresses also reemphasises the importance of the 
need not to wield forgiveness domineeringly as a weapon of power (cf. WL 295/
SKS 9 292-3). Recall Helen Prejean. What makes such an agapic attitude as hers 
possible in the context of forgiveness is inter alia the humility expressed in the 
recognition of the equal value of all before God (WL 342/SKS 9 336-7) and the 
need we all have for forgiveness, which, taken seriously, muddies the waters 
of any simple division of the world into “wrongdoers” and “wronged parties”; 
“perpetrators” and “victims”. 
My final suggestion, then, is that what looks from some perspectives like 
“blindness” to justice is actually a manifestation of an admirable kind of humility. 
Space constraints preclude a full account of the kind of humility I have in mind,67 
but we can outline some of its central features. One such is other-focus: an 
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orientation towards people and other things of value in the world such that we 
appreciate and promote their value apart from their instrumental value to ourselves. 
This orientation stems, in part, from a sense of dependence: a recognition that 
whatever we have achieved inevitably depends upon other people, institutions 
and circumstances beyond our control.68 Exemplars of such humility are those 
who focus less on themselves and more on what they find worthwhile in the world 
other than themselves, such that the “spirit of comparison” with others that 
Kierkegaard finds such a damaging element of human psychology is quietened.69 
Such humility is, I suggest, in large part what enables us to get beyond the hurt 
pride that often stands in the way of forgiveness. And such humility is certainly not 
to be conflated with servility. Indeed, we might even think of it as a kind of moral 
strength. Robert C. Roberts, for instance—for whom humility is “a disposition not 
to feel the emotions associated with caring a lot about one’s status”70—describes 
it as “a transcendent form of self-confidence”.71 Such a person has an “implicit and 
inarticulate sense of his own worth”72 that does not depend on his comparative 
value to others. And because such a person’s sense of self-worth does not depend 
upon a sort of ranking derived from the “spirit of comparison”, this will make 
easier a willingness to forego the sense of moral superiority towards those who 
have wronged us to which we might otherwise feel entitled. But this does not 
amount to the lack of self-respect that philosophers of forgiveness have worried 
about. Indeed, such willingness is also a kind of courage, insofar as it involves what 
Christopher Bennett describes as “having sufficient confidence in your own status 
… that you are prepared to make yourself vulnerable to further insult in order to 
reach out to the wrongdoer in some way—for instance in the hope of encouraging 
his return to the moral community”.73 It is such an attitude, I submit—an attitude 
of hope and what Kierkegaard elsewhere calls “humble courage”—that makes 
possible love’s forgiveness.
 University of Hertfordshire
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